Janowski/Fleming v. Board of Parole, 349 Or 432 (2011)

1)     Statute requires that those sentenced to a mandatory minimum of thirty (30) years be given a hearing after twenty (20), and if the parole board unanimously finds that such prisoner is “likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time,” the mandatory minimum be converted to life with the possibility of parole. Use of the indeterminate phrase “reasonable period of time” means the legislature appreciated that the prisoner could conceivably be released prior to thirty (30) years. at p. 441.

2)     When the legislature uses the word “shall,” the statute is directory and the Board of Parole has no discretion. at p. 441.

3)     The plain, ordinary, and, natural meaning of the word “convert” is to “change or turn from one state to another * * *. (cite omitted).” at p. 441.

4)     A second statute which cross-references the statute at bar, and, was adopted at the same time, is the most relevant context for consideration. at p. 443.

5)     An examination of relevant case law shows that the Court long has read the applicable statute in a way consistent with the result in this case. at p. 445.

6)     Even where there is no express language so directing, where the legislative record is replete with comments reflecting the legislators’ assumption that the parole matrix would apply when a thirty (30) year minimum sentence is converted to life with the possibility of parole, and, the statutes contain no contrary directive, the matrix should be used. at pp. 450-53.

Harris and Harris, 349 Or 393 (2010)

1)     Statute providing for award of compensatory spousal support where there has been a “significant” contribution “by one party to the education, training, vocational skills, career or earning capacity of the other * * *,” does not require more than a normal or typical contribution. Essentially, Webster’s defines “significant” as “having meaning,” and, as long as such contributions “are meaningful and likely to have influence and effect” they are “significant.” at p. 402.

2)    Although the former statute spoke of property distribution and the present statute casts the relevant monetary award as spousal support, this is a distinction without a difference. Thus, the former statute, and, case law interpreting it, is part of the context within which the current statute must be interpreted. at p. 404.

3)     Although amended statute expanded the factors to be considered when awarding money, substitution of the disjunctive connector “or” for the word “and” suggests that the legislature did not intend to establish a higher threshold for monetary award. at p. 405.

4)     The Staff Measure Summary from the relevant Senate committee, and, testimony of non-legislative drafters of the bill, support the Court’s holding in this case. at pp. 405-07.

Hopkin v. SAIF Corp., 349 Or 348 (2010)

1)      Even where the statute is not ambiguous, if examination of the text and context fails to provide the answer, Courts must turn to legislative history. at p. 356.

2)     Where the legislature establishes a task force of non-legislators to propose a rewrite of the statutes, testimony of such non-legislators to future legislatures is given considerable weight. at pp. 356-57.

3)   Legislative history reveals that the lawmakers intentionally left the term arthritis undefined, leaving the task to the common law, the Worker’s Compensation Board, and, the appellate courts. at p. 360.

4)    Court will turn to both regular and medical dictionaries when defining medical terms used in statutes. at pp. 361-62.

Clackamas County Assessor v. Village At Main Street Phase II, 349 Or 330 (2010)

1)     Where the text of Oregon’s 1907 omitted property law is virtually identical to Indiana’s omitted property law, inference can be made that Oregon modeled its statute on Indiana’s. at p. 337.

2)   When interpreting a 1907 statute, context includes preexisting common law and statutory framework. at p. 337.

3)    When interpreting statute borrowed from another state, context includes that state’s supreme court’s prior interpretations of the borrowed statute. at p. 337.

4)    Subsequent legislative amendments were consistent with and did not change earlier understanding of the 1907 statute. at p. 345.

Polacek and Polacek, 349 Or 278 (2010)

1)     Where statutory terms have acquired a well-defined legal meaning, Courts apply that legal definition. at p. 284.

2)     A statute’s context includes: (1) other provisions of the same or related statutes; (2) the pre-existing statutory framework; and, (3) prior case law. at p. 284.

3)     The Oregon Supreme Court initially considers cases on review, which may or may not ripen into an appeal. Accordingly, lawyer effort expended successfully resisting a petition for review did not invoke the statute awarding attorneys fees on an appeal. at pp. 285-87.

State v. E.V., 240 OrApp 298 (2010)

     Where the juvenile code expressly incorporates the definition of restitution found in the general criminal code, and such language includes a broad definition of the word victim, the broad definition of victim controls over the narrower definition which could be inferred from other sections of the juvenile code. at p. 304.

Jeld-Wen, Inc. V. PacifiCorp, 240 OrApp 124 (2010)

1)    Where Oregon adopted the revised Uniform Arbitration Act, commentary to revised uniform act serves as legislative history. at p. 129.

2)     Even though the commentary did not address the specific fact situation presented by this case, the rationale expressed in the commentary is applicable. at p. 130.

Examilotis v. Department of State Lands, 239 OrApp 522 (2010)

1)    The plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning of the word “project” encompasses the total development, of which the “proposed fill” is just a part. at p. 534.

2)    Although not defined for this specific statute, the meaning placed on the word “project” in this case is corroborated by two other related statutes. at p. 535.

State v. Kelly, 239 OrApp 266 (2010)

1)    Context includes the backdrop of the common law within which the statute was enacted. at p. 277.

2)     Statute codified common-law rule requiring “other proof” besides a confession for a murder conviction. The purpose of this rule, corpus delicti, was to prevent convictions on false confessions where no murder had, in fact, occurred. Relying on a repeated confession “does not satisfy that aim.” at p 278.

Hill v. Evans, 239 OrApp 233 (2010)

      Statute states that copy of the notice to vacate “must” be attached to the complaint in a FED action. Here, the notice was filed shortly after filing of complaint. Fact that failure to comply with the statute did not affect renter’s “substantial rights” is immaterial. at p. 238.

Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Martinez, 239 OrApp 224 (2010)

1)    When used in the introduction to a statute, the word “including” identifies items that share characteristics with items expressly set-out. at p. 229.

2)   “Board, rent, housing, and lodging” are all payments for specific benefits or specific benefits themselves. In contrast short-term disability payments are fungible, and can be used quite broadly. Thus, such payments are not included within the statute. at p. 229.