Malan v. Tipton, 349 Or 638 (2011)

    A statute’s text and context includes “preexisting common law and prior relevant case law.” (cites omitted). at p. 645.

State v. Kellar, 349 Or 626 (2011)

1)    The text of a statute should not be read in isolation, but, the so-called “plain reading” must be placed in context. “In this case, the statutory context cuts against defendant’s interpretation in three respects.” at p. 634.

2)    When placing an interpretation on statutes, courts should seek to avoid redundancy, so as to give effect to all words and phrases. at p. 636.

Carrillo v. City of Stanfield, 241 OrApp 151 (2011)

1)    Use of the singular noun “contract” prefaced by the definite article “the” means the legislature intended the attorney’s fee cap to apply to a single contract. Accordingly, where multiple claims are based on the same contract, those claims must be aggregated. However, where multiple claims are based on separate contracts, aggregation is inappropriate. at pp. 157-58.

2)     If the legislature uses the same term in related statutes, the court infers that the term has the same meaning in each case. Conversely, if the legislature uses different terms, the court infers the legislature intends a different meaning. This reasoning applies when comparing different versions of the bill which became the statute. at pp. 158-60.

State v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 241 OrApp 107 (2011)

1)    “‘Fraud’ is a term of art naming a common-law cause of action. We presume that, the legislature intends such terms to carry their specialized meaning (cite omitted) and, as a common-law cause of action, fraud necessarily requires reliance.” at p. 115.

2)    “‘Deceit’” is * * * a common-law tort with a reliance requirement. (cite omitted). In non-technical usage, an act is not deceit unless someone is deceived; Deception cannot occur in a vacuum.” at p. 115.

3)    To mislead is “‘to lead in a wrong direction or into a mistaken action or belief.’ (cite omitted). One cannot ‘lead’ without ‘leading’ something or somebody else.” at pp. 115-16.

4)    Unlike the United States Supreme Court, Oregon courts do not interpret security statutes flexibly so as to effectuate their remedial purposes. For the U.S. Court, this means congressional history must be consulted. In Oregon, resort to legislative history is allowed, but not required, to interpret statutes. at p. 118.

Miller v. Tri-Met, 241 OrApp 86 (2011)

    The Wrongful Death Act allows a personal representative of the state to enforce the individual claims of each survivor. For purposes of the 2007 version of the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA), the personal representative is not a single claimant so as to be subject to the cap listed therein. Each beneficiary is entitled to recover up to the statutory limit. at pp. 92-93.

Mayfly Group Inc. V. Ruiz, 241 OrApp 77 (2011)

1)    While the general rule says that an illegal contract will not be enforced, where the illegality consists of statutory violation, the question of enforceability is “one of legislative intent.” at p. 81.

2)    The Farm Labor Contractor’s Act contains numerous provisions for enforcing its licensing provisions, voiding contracts of unlicensed farm labor contractors is not among them, and, the Court will not add what is not there. The same reasoning applies in the case of an unlicensed worker leasing company. at p. 81.

3)    During enactment of the Farm Labor Contractor’s Act, there was some legislative discussion of penalties for failure to obtain a license, and there was no discussion of invalidating contracts negotiated by unlicensed leasing companies. at pp. 81-83.

State v. Kirkland, 241 OrApp 40 (2011)

     Statutory language describing prima facie evidence of intent creates a presumption and doesn’t constitute additional elements of the crime. The Court’s interpretation of this specific statute is supported by the commentary to the 1971 revision of the criminal code. at pp. 45-46.