State v. Kurtz, 350 Or 65 (2011)

1)    The applicable statutory definition of “police officer” does not expressly include tribal police. However, use of the word “includes” in the statute’s leading phrase means the legislature intended to identify some, but not all, persons that deserve that label. The plain and ordinary meaning of the title “police officer” is broad enough to include tribal officers. at p. 72.

2)    The applicable statutory definition “peace officer” does not expressly include tribal police. However, fact that statute ends with the phrase “and such other persons who may be designated by law,” is evidence of “an intent to make the list non-exhaustive. at p. 71.

3)    While the directly applicable statutory definitions of “police officer” and “peace officer” do not expressly include tribal police, other statutory definitions of the terms do. This provides further support for the notion that the tribal officer was empowered to make an arrest for attempting to elude and resisting arrest, even though such arrest was effectuated off reservation land. at pp. 76-79.

4)     A holding that tribal police are not “police officers” would create a “jurisdictional void” when non-Indians transgress against tribal police. at p. 80.

5)     The legislature has, in general, entrusted tribal police with the enforcement of Oregon laws, and Courts must not construe term “police officer” in this specific statute so narrowly as to distort general legislative intent. at p. 80.

State v. Stokes, 350 Or 44 (2011)

1)    The context of the statute includes “the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted. * * *. The context also includes case law interpreting the statute.” at p. 49.

2)     Oregon’s original criminal code was based largely on New York law. Accordingly, the commentary to the 1850 New York Code is persuasive as to legislative intent. at p. 51.

State v. Lopez, 241 OrApp 670 (2011)

1)    When interpreting the Oregon Evidence Code, the legislative commentary is part of that Code’s legislative history. at p. 676.

2)    The “plain, natural, and ordinary meaning” of the term “confinement” in OEC 609 unambiguously means actual incarceration. at p. 677.

3)     Absent support in the statute’s text or the legislative commentary, recommendation in Prof. Kirkpatrick’s treatise on Oregon evidence not persuasive. at p. 679.

Burke v. DCLD, 241 OrApp 658 (2011)

1)    “The term ‘owner’ has no fixed meaning as it applies to real property law. * * *. Rather, the text, context, and legislative history of a statute determine what constitutes an owner under a particular statute.” at pages 664-65.

2)    Use of the word “or” in the subsection defining owner makes “the paragraphs that it separates alternative, not cumulative, ways of coming within the definition of owner.” at p. 665-68.

3)    “(T)he purchaser under a land sale contract * * * not the seller, is the owner of the subject real property for purposes of a Measure 49 claim.” at p. 669.

State v. Kuperus, 241 OrApp 605 (2011)

1)    The plain meaning of the terms used to define a dangerous weapon ORS 161.015(1) “suggests something external to the human body and thus would not encompass defendant’s own teeth.” at p. 609.

2)    If the text, context and other legislative history counsel a contrary result, a single reference supporting a different position is unavailing. Cherry-picked quotations from a single legislator or a nonlegislator witnesses carry little weight. at p. 611.

3)    Supreme Court has suggested that official commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission is superior to other legislative history. at p. 611.

State ex. rel. Stewart v. City of Salem, 241 OrApp 528 (2011)

1)     When a property owner proposes a partition, ORS 227.178(1) directs that the city shall take final action “within 120 days after the application is deemed complete.” Use of the word “shall“, in conjunction with the “mandamus procedure is to assure ‘prompt governmental action(.)’” at p. 535.

2)    Where owner proposed a partition, then, submitted an alternative plan, but, at the city’s prompting, reverted to the original plan, the 120-day deadline runs from the date the original request was deemed complete. at p. 535.

State v. Elmore, 241 OrApp 419 (2011)

     ORS 815.220(2) says that windows are obstructed if “any material * * * impairs the ability to see into or out of the vehicle(.)” The essence of dictionary definitions of “material” is generally something that has physical substance. Thus, driving with a cracked windshield is not a violation of the statute prohibiting driving with obstructed windows, and, there was no probable cause for the stop. at pages 426-27.

State v. Moncada, 241 OrApp 202 (2011)

1)    Where the statute does not expressly identify who qualifies as a victim, courts determine the “gravamen of the crime and determine the class of persons” the legislature intended to protect. at page 212.

2)     Where the crime is failure to perform the duties of a driver, each person in a single accident is a separate victim. at page 212.