State v. Marshall, 350 Or 208 (2011)

1)    For sexual assault to rise to the first degree, it is insufficient that unrelated forcible compulsion is shown at or about the same time. The forcible compulsion must be employed to accomplish the prohibited sexual contact. This “causal connection” is “implicit in the text of the statute.” at pp. 217-18.

2)    For sexual assault to rise to the first degree, it is insufficient that unrelated forcible compulsion is shown at or about the same time. The forcible compulsion must be employed to accomplish the prohibited sexual contact. The need for this “causal connection” is strengthened by comparing the text defining third, as opposed to first, degree sexual abuse. at p. 218.

3)    For sexual assault to rise to the first degree, it is insufficient that unrelated forcible compulsion is shown at or about the same time. The forcible compulsion must be employed to accomplish the prohibited sexual contact. The need for this “causal connection” is strengthened by the fact that these two elements of the crime are defined by the exact same sentence structure, suggesting that the second phrase – “subjected to forcible compulsion” – should be read in light of the first phrase – “subjects * * * to sexual contact.” at p. 218.

4)    The text and context – including textual changes in the statute from one year to another, as well as textual changes in the last bill as it moved through the legislative process – provide clues as to legislative intent. at p. 225.

Force v. Dept. of Rev., 350 Or 179 (2011)

1)    Even though the relevant state tax statutes refer to taxes allowable or payable under the federal tax code, the question is what the Oregon Legislature intended when it used those terms. (cite omitted) (“Federal tax law does not control the tax law of Oregon.”). at p. 187.

2)    “In ordinary usage, the term ‘allowable’ * * * connotes something that exists in the abstract or has yet to occur, as opposed to something that already has been allowed.” at p. 187.

3)    ORS 118.010(2) speaks of the state “death tax credit” that is allowable “under section 2011 of the Internal Revenue Code.” This does not mean the federal code as it currently reads, because ORS 118.007, part of the statutory context, says “any reference to the federal tax law ‘means the federal * * * Code as amended and in effect on December 31, 2000.’” at p. 188.

Roberts v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co, 242 OrApp 474 (2011)

1)    Single quote from a legislator-witness explaining the intent of the proposed statute not an example of cherry-picking even though it is the only relevant statement found, where nothing in the rest of the legislative history suggests the bill had a different focus. at pp. 483-84.

2)   Plaintiff complained to her supervisor that workers under her control were skipping meal and break periods – a violation of state law – and thereby leaving work early. She was subsequently fired for registering the complaint and brought an action for employment discrimination. The relevant statute only protects employees who report criminal activity. Here, plaintiff admits that, at the time of making the report, she didn’t know the activity was criminal. at p. 484.

Sanchez v. SAIF, 242 OrApp 339 (2011)

1)     The relevant statute states that a worker’s compensation claim shall be closed “when * * * there is sufficient information to determine permanent disability, (emphasis theirs),” thus, unambiguously requiring that “sufficient information” must be present at the time of claim closure, and, cannot include information generated post-closure and submitted in a motion for reconsideration. at pp. 347-48.

2)    Fact that the statute allows, when deciding certain issues, consideration of new information provided during the reconsideration process, does not mean that the new information can be considered as to all issues. at p. 348.

Simpson v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 242 OrApp 287 (2011)

1)    “To determine the meaning of a statutory term, we look to the words of the statute in context, and, if necessary, to the legislative history and other interpretive aids.” (citing State v. Gaines) at p. 298.

2)    Absent a legislative definition, Courts give words their “plain, natural, and ordinary meaning unless the context indicates” otherwise. Here, other wildlife statutes indicate that the word “property,” as used in the relevant statute, does not encompass the ordinary meaning of that word. at p. 298.

3)     “* * * Context includes related statutes and prior versions of the statute, (cite omitted), as well as the pre-existing common law and statutory framework within which the law was enacted, (cite omitted).” at p. 298.

4)     A single bill produced one statute that said all wildlife is “property” of the state and a second saying that all wildlife is not the “property” of the state. “That apparent conflict – of which the legislature must have been aware – indicates that “property” means two different things in the two different statutes.” at p. 298.

State v. Osborne, 242 OrApp 85 (2011)

1)     As relevant here, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary defines “use,” as “to carry out a purpose or action by means of: make instrumental to an end or process: apply to advantage: turn to account: UTILIZE[.]” at p. 89.

2)   The Commentary to the Proposed Criminal Code produced by the Criminal Law Revision Commission provides examples of what would constitute first-degree robbery, and, one such example closely mirrors that facts at bar. at p. 90.

3)     Contrasting the commentary accompanying the text defining third-degree robbery with that accompanying the text defining first-degree robbery provides further support for the Court’s holding. at pp. 90-91.