State v. McLaughlin, 243 OrApp 214 (2011)

1)    When presented with a question of statutory construction, a Court first looks “at the text and context of the statutes, and will consider legislative history if it appears useful to the court’s analysis.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at p. 218.

2)    The restitution statute unambiguously requires the state to present “evidence of the nature and amount of the damages.” Here, the state failed, completely, to satisfy the second part of that mandate. at p 220.

State v. Donovan, 243 OrApp 187 (2011)

1)    When faced with a question of statutory construction, Oregon Courts “examine the text of the relevant statutes in context, along with any pertinent legislative history.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at p. 191.

2)   Whether another jurisdiction’s statute is a “statutory counterpart” is a question of statutory construction. at p 191.

3)   Despite differences in wording and scope, Oregon’s and New York’s general DUII statutes “share a common function and many of the same characteristics.” This creates a strong presumption that they are “statutory counterparts.” at p. 195.

4)  The legislative history, “although somewhat general,” confirms that the 2007 amendments to Oregon’s DUII statute did not intend to narrow the meaning of “statutory counterpart.” at p. 197.

5)    Acceptable legislative history includes statements of both legislator and non-legislator witnesses, as well as members of the committee. at p. 197.

Eusiquio v. Dept. of Human Services, 243 OrApp 100 (2011)

1)    Wording changes made in statute from one session to another are part of the context within which the statute is construed. at p. 112.

2)    Fact that 1997 amendments to the relevant statute removed any reference to the APA and added a requirement that the Court “fix a time and place for hearing,” suggests that the legislature intended to remove judicial review of this type of agency decision from the APA and create a separate statutory proceeding. Otherwise, why include an express hearing requirement when the APA already has one in place? at p. 112.

3)    Fact that 1997 amendments to the relevant statute expressly required that the state registrar be given notice of, and, allowed to appear at, the scheduled hearing suggests that the legislature intended to remove judicial review of this type of agency decision from the APA and create a separate statutory proceeding. After all, the registrar is a necessary party under the APA and would receive notice as a matter of course. at p. 112.

State v. Tyson, 243 OrApp 94 (2011)

1)    When presented with “a question of statutory construction * * * we examine the text of the statute in context and in light of any pertinent legislative history proffered by the parties to determine the legislature’s intent.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at pp. 96-97.

2)    Statute makes it a crime to use a child “in sexually explicit conduct for any person to observe * * *.” (emphasis mine). The common meaning of “any” is broad enough to include another person also engaging in the sexual conduct. at pp 97-98.

3)    Despite disclaimor, a Staff Measure Analysis is among the documents that make up the legislative history. at p. 98.

4)     “‘* * * legislative history cannot substitute for, or contradict the text of, [a] statute.’ (cite omitted). Given that the statute clearly encompasses the conduct at issue, and no latent ambiguity is suggested by the legislative history”, (cite omitted, emphasis mine), a plain reading of the statute will prevail. at p. 99.

Watkins v. Josephine County, 243 OrApp 52 (2011)

1)   When interpreting statutes, “we deploy the familiar strategies of statutory construction, that is, examination of the text, context, legislative history, and (if necessary) maxims of construction.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at p. 59.

2)   The context surrounding the personnel ordinance – a clause in the ordinance stating that “* * * ‘the Board (of Commissioners) shall take (future) action as they deem appropriate” (emphasis theirs, parentheses mine), and, a section of the county charter which directs that personnel services and compensation “shall be fixed annually” (emphasis theirs) – clearly counsels against the permanence of any specific benefit. at p. 61.

3)   When a contract is created by a statute or ordinance, whether other documents and oral assurances are part of the contract is a question of legislative intent. Applicable statute requires a majority vote by the Commissioners to transact county business. Accordingly, all persons are “charged with knowing that statements from sources other than a majority of county commissioners do not bind the county.” at p. 61.

Clackamas County Employees’ Assn v. Clackamas County, 243 OrApp 34 (2011)

1)    When the case involves an agency’s interpretation of statutory language, the standard of review depends on whether the language at bar is: (a) an exact term; (b) an inexact term; or, (c) a delegative term. at pp. 38-39.

2)    Here, the phrase at bar is inexact, meaning the Court uses the same test as it does to construe any statute. at 39.

3)    Oregon Courts seek to discern legislative intent “by examining the text of the statute in context, along with helpful legislative history and, if necessary, other aids to construction. (citing, State v. Gaines). at pp. 39-40.

4)   Here, the Employment Relations Board (ERB) misconstrued the intent behind the statute making it an unfair labor practice for a public employer to “[i]nterfere with, restrain or coerce employees” (statute described at p. 37) in the exercise of their protected employment rights. at pp. 42-43.

Morgan v. Amex Assurance Co., 242 OrApp 665 (2011)

1)    ORS 174.010 requires that where numerous statutes are implicated, the Court, if possible, is to adopt a construction “that will give effect to all.” at p. 670.

2)   Plaintiff successfully sued in Oregon court on an insurance policy issued in Washington. ORS 742.061 directs that fees be awarded when a successful action is brought “upon any policy of insurance of any kind or nature(.)” ORS 742.001, however, limits the scope of chapter 742 to policies issued within Oregon. Giving both these statutes their plain meaning does damage to neither. The fee provision applies only to policies issued in this state. at p. 670.

3)     A 1986 Court of Appeals’ decision which seems to foreclose the result reached in this case “does not include any analysis of the statute itself and thus is not helpful in resolving the issue presented here.” at pp. 671-72.

State v. Powell, 242 OrApp 645 (2011)

1)    The only express prohibition in applicable statute is introduction of a confession “made under the influence of fear produced by threats.” (emphasis mine). A long line of Oregon cases, though, dating back to 1881, hold that such statutes were not intended to abrogate the common-law rule that likewise prohibited confessions “induced by promises of leniency.” (emphasis mine). at pp. 651-52.

2)    Applicable statute prohibits introduction of an induced confession made “in the course of judicial proceeding or otherwise(.)” (emphasis mine). The common meaning of the word “otherwise” is “under other conditions.” Thus, under this statute, induced confessions are inadmissible, even if made to private persons. at pp. 653.

3)    Applicable statute prohibits (1) conviction by an uncorroborated confession; and (2) conviction by confessions produced by threats or promises of leniency. The first prohibition has been held to apply to confessions made to private citizens. Words are presumed to have the same meaning throughout the statute, and, since “the corroboration provisions applies to confessions made to private persons, we infer that the voluntariness provision [does likewise].” (emphasis & brackets mine). at pp. 653-54.

4)    Current statute prohibiting induced confession dates back to 1957. That same year, the legislature adopted a statute prohibiting introduction of evidence of certain conduct made while “in the custody of a police officer.” If the lawmakers had intended that the induced confessions statute not apply to confessions made to private individuals “it could have employed similarly precise language(.)” at pp. 654-65.

State v. Miller, 242 OrApp 572 (2011)

    The plain meaning of “work area” is a defined space that is adequate to permit a person to accomplish a “labor, task, or duty.” That definition encompasses the hallway of the Old Jail in Washington County. at p. 578.