1)   When construing a statute, Courts give words of common usage their plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning. at pp. 418-19.

2)   According to applicable statute, to supercede written policy, an oral insurance binder must use “clear and express” terms. The common usage of the word clear means easily understood, and the term express means directly and distinctly stated as opposed to implied or left to inference. at p. 419.

3)   “(T)he terms ‘safety net’ or ‘catch basin’ or coverage ‘in all instances that something goes wrong during construction’ were not vague or obscure.” (emphasis mine). at p. 419.

1)   “(* * * the paramount goal in statutory interpretation is discerning the legislature’s intent, which is accomplished by first examining statutory text and context, along with any useful legislative history).” (explaining, State v. Gaines). at p. 83.

2)   The word intent is not defined in the criminal code, and has so many meanings in common usage that a statute using the word can only be interpreted by resorting to legislative history. at p. 84.

3)    A statement made to the Criminal Law Revision Commission by one of its reporters, as well as that reporter’s comments to the Senate Committee considering the proposed revision, is part of this statute’s legislative history. at pp. 84-85.

4)   Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission’s Proposed Oregon Criminal Code is part of this statute’s legislative history. at pp. 84-85.

5)    A defendant charged with a crime requiring proof of a reckless mental state may offer evidence of a mental disease or defect sufficient to negate that element. at p. 86.

    A plain reading of the applicable statute shows that, even though she pleaded no contest, the defendant can appeal the order that imposed a condition of her probation where, as here, she has shown a colorable claim of error in the sentencing proceedings. at p. 525.

1)   “When construing a statute, we examine the text of the statute in context, along with any relevant legislative history, to discern the legislature’s intent.” citing State v. Gaines. at p. 506.

2)   When construing a statute, Courts give words of common usage their plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning. at p. 507.

3)   As used in the applicable statute, the phrase “used in * * * service to the public” means “property used in the provision of a benefit to the public.” at p. 507.

4)   As used in the applicable statute, the term direct means property “closely related to or immediately used in the provision of transportation to the public.” at p. 508.

5)   Testimony of industry proponents of the bill can be used to discern legislative intent. at pp. 509-11.

6)   At trial, a witness described the track as a main-line track. From this, a trier of fact could infer that track was used to provide service to the public, as Webster’s defines main line as “a principal highway or railroad line.” Defendant offered no evidence to defeat that inference.” (emphasis mine). at p. 512.

1)   When construing a statute, Courts give words of common usage their plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning, but, when words have a well-defined legal meaning, such meaning controls. at p. 339.

2)    For purposes of statutory construction, the word cohabit does not simply mean living in the same residence, but has the “usual and accepted legal meaning” of two unmarried persons living together as spouses. at p. 339.

1)   The context of a statute includes prior judicial constructions of the statute. (cites omitted). at p. 294.

2)    There are two statutes addressing failure to perform the duties of a driver, one where the accident results in property damage, and, a second where the accident results in personal injury. Use of the disjunctive “or” in the restitution statute that follows indicates that defendants may be held responsible for any and all damages resulting from the accident, regardless of which statute they are convicted of violating. at pp. 294-95.

3)   “* * * nothing in (the) related statutory context or the barren legislative history contradicts” (internal footnote omitted) the plain reading of the statute. at p. 295.

1)    When presented with a question of statutory construction, a Court first looks “at the text and context of the statutes, and will consider legislative history if it appears useful to the court’s analysis.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at p. 218.

2)    The restitution statute unambiguously requires the state to present “evidence of the nature and amount of the damages.” Here, the state failed, completely, to satisfy the second part of that mandate. at p 220.

1)    When faced with a question of statutory construction, Oregon Courts “examine the text of the relevant statutes in context, along with any pertinent legislative history.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at p. 191.

2)   Whether another jurisdiction’s statute is a “statutory counterpart” is a question of statutory construction. at p 191.

3)   Despite differences in wording and scope, Oregon’s and New York’s general DUII statutes “share a common function and many of the same characteristics.” This creates a strong presumption that they are “statutory counterparts.” at p. 195.

4)  The legislative history, “although somewhat general,” confirms that the 2007 amendments to Oregon’s DUII statute did not intend to narrow the meaning of “statutory counterpart.” at p. 197.

5)    Acceptable legislative history includes statements of both legislator and non-legislator witnesses, as well as members of the committee. at p. 197.

1)    Wording changes made in statute from one session to another are part of the context within which the statute is construed. at p. 112.

2)    Fact that 1997 amendments to the relevant statute removed any reference to the APA and added a requirement that the Court “fix a time and place for hearing,” suggests that the legislature intended to remove judicial review of this type of agency decision from the APA and create a separate statutory proceeding. Otherwise, why include an express hearing requirement when the APA already has one in place? at p. 112.

3)    Fact that 1997 amendments to the relevant statute expressly required that the state registrar be given notice of, and, allowed to appear at, the scheduled hearing suggests that the legislature intended to remove judicial review of this type of agency decision from the APA and create a separate statutory proceeding. After all, the registrar is a necessary party under the APA and would receive notice as a matter of course. at p. 112.

1)    When presented with “a question of statutory construction * * * we examine the text of the statute in context and in light of any pertinent legislative history proffered by the parties to determine the legislature’s intent.” (citing, State v. Gaines). at pp. 96-97.

2)    Statute makes it a crime to use a child “in sexually explicit conduct for any person to observe * * *.” (emphasis mine). The common meaning of “any” is broad enough to include another person also engaging in the sexual conduct. at pp 97-98.

3)    Despite disclaimor, a Staff Measure Analysis is among the documents that make up the legislative history. at p. 98.

4)     “‘* * * legislative history cannot substitute for, or contradict the text of, [a] statute.’ (cite omitted). Given that the statute clearly encompasses the conduct at issue, and no latent ambiguity is suggested by the legislative history”, (cite omitted, emphasis mine), a plain reading of the statute will prevail. at p. 99.