Stuart v. Pittman, 350 Or 410 (2011)

1)   When construing a statute, Courts give words of common usage their plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning. at pp. 418-19.

2)   According to applicable statute, to supercede written policy, an oral insurance binder must use “clear and express” terms. The common usage of the word clear means easily understood, and the term express means directly and distinctly stated as opposed to implied or left to inference. at p. 419.

3)   “(T)he terms ‘safety net’ or ‘catch basin’ or coverage ‘in all instances that something goes wrong during construction’ were not vague or obscure.” (emphasis mine). at p. 419.

State v. Nebert, 244 OrApp 80 (2011)

1)   “(* * * the paramount goal in statutory interpretation is discerning the legislature’s intent, which is accomplished by first examining statutory text and context, along with any useful legislative history).” (explaining, State v. Gaines). at p. 83.

2)   The word intent is not defined in the criminal code, and has so many meanings in common usage that a statute using the word can only be interpreted by resorting to legislative history. at p. 84.

3)    A statement made to the Criminal Law Revision Commission by one of its reporters, as well as that reporter’s comments to the Senate Committee considering the proposed revision, is part of this statute’s legislative history. at pp. 84-85.

4)   Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission’s Proposed Oregon Criminal Code is part of this statute’s legislative history. at pp. 84-85.

5)    A defendant charged with a crime requiring proof of a reckless mental state may offer evidence of a mental disease or defect sufficient to negate that element. at p. 86.

State v. Donahue, 243 OrApp 520 (2011)

    A plain reading of the applicable statute shows that, even though she pleaded no contest, the defendant can appeal the order that imposed a condition of her probation where, as here, she has shown a colorable claim of error in the sentencing proceedings. at p. 525.

State v. Wray, 243 OrApp 503 (2011)

1)   “When construing a statute, we examine the text of the statute in context, along with any relevant legislative history, to discern the legislature’s intent.” citing State v. Gaines. at p. 506.

2)   When construing a statute, Courts give words of common usage their plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning. at p. 507.

3)   As used in the applicable statute, the phrase “used in * * * service to the public” means “property used in the provision of a benefit to the public.” at p. 507.

4)   As used in the applicable statute, the term direct means property “closely related to or immediately used in the provision of transportation to the public.” at p. 508.

5)   Testimony of industry proponents of the bill can be used to discern legislative intent. at pp. 509-11.

6)   At trial, a witness described the track as a main-line track. From this, a trier of fact could infer that track was used to provide service to the public, as Webster’s defines main line as “a principal highway or railroad line.” Defendant offered no evidence to defeat that inference.” (emphasis mine). at p. 512.

State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. C.M.C., 243 OrApp 335 (2011)

1)   When construing a statute, Courts give words of common usage their plain, natural, and, ordinary meaning, but, when words have a well-defined legal meaning, such meaning controls. at p. 339.

2)    For purposes of statutory construction, the word cohabit does not simply mean living in the same residence, but has the “usual and accepted legal meaning” of two unmarried persons living together as spouses. at p. 339.

State v. Bassett, 243 OrApp 289 (2011)

1)   The context of a statute includes prior judicial constructions of the statute. (cites omitted). at p. 294.

2)    There are two statutes addressing failure to perform the duties of a driver, one where the accident results in property damage, and, a second where the accident results in personal injury. Use of the disjunctive “or” in the restitution statute that follows indicates that defendants may be held responsible for any and all damages resulting from the accident, regardless of which statute they are convicted of violating. at pp. 294-95.

3)   “* * * nothing in (the) related statutory context or the barren legislative history contradicts” (internal footnote omitted) the plain reading of the statute. at p. 295.