Cortez v. Nacco Materials Handling Group, 248 Or 435 (2012)

Holding:   While an LLC, acting as an employer, is shielded from lawsuits by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ comp statutes, that protection does not extend to members of the LLC.

1)  “In determining legislative intent, we consider the statutory text, context, and any relevant legislative history.” citing State v. Gaines. at p. 440.

2)   A Court cannot insert in the statute what has been omitted, or omit what has been inserted. citing a pre-Gaines case not named PGE v. B.O.L.I. at p. 440.

3)   If the legislature had intended to include members of an LLC in the exclusive remedy statutes, a review of other LLC statutes shows that it knew how to do so, expressly. at pp. 441-42.

4)   Case law supports the reasoning adopted, here. at p. 442.

5)   CLE materials are not authority of any kind. at p. 444.

6)   “Generally, commentary from a uniform act that the Oregon legislature has enacted is relevant” indicator of legislative intent. at p. 444.

Oregon AFSCME Council 75 v. Hood River County, 248 OrApp 293 (2012)

Holding:   The county committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to deduct from each paycheck a percentage, rather than a set amount.

1)   A Court construes statutes by examining “the text of the statute in context, along with any helpful legislative history provided by the parties and, if necessary, by applying relevant canons of statutory construction. citing State v. Gaines and PGE v. B.O.L.I. at p. 298.

2)  Where there is no statutory definition, Courts give terms their plain and ordinary meanings. at p. 298.

3)   Among the terms Webster’s uses to define amount is the word sum. at p. 299.

4)  Webster’s defines sum as, among other things, “an indefinite or specified amount of money.” at p. 299.

5)   Furthermore, the statute requires the county to deduct an “amount of money indicated” in a written request from the union. Webster’s defines the verb indicate as pointing “toward with more or less exactness.” This argues against amount being defined as a sum certain. at p. 299.

Derkatsch v. Thorp, Purdy, Jewett, 248 OrApp 185 (2012)

Holding:   While the relevant statute authorized fees from the protected person’s resources for efforts expended during the successful protective proceeding, the statute did not authorize payment of fees for efforts expended in a separate case on behalf of that person prior to the protection order being entered.

1)  Courts resolve issues of statutory construction “by examining the statutory text and context, any pertinent legislative history, and, if necessary, applying maxims of construction.” citing State v. Gaines and PGE v. B.O.L.I. at p. 193.

2)   Paragraphs two (2) and three (3) of the statute require court approval before payment for the services described in those paragraphs. Paragraph one (1) does not require prior approval. This difference in wording in no way prohibits a Court from ordering payment of funds pursuant to paragraph one (1). at pp. 194-95.

3)   Even if the benefits of the separate law suit accrued to the protected person after she received that status, a plain reading of the statute prohibits payment under that statute for work done on a separate law suit prior to the protection order being entered. at p. 197, ftn 6.